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ABSTRACT: This study analyzes the negative performance of Calabria’s Regional 
Program 2000-2006, for the enhancement of cultural goods to attract tourism, as an ex-
ample of the waste of resources of EU ambitious planning for the economic convergence. 
The empirical analysis shows that the variables relating to cultural sites, education sites 
and sites with tourism or tourism potentialities had no significance or even negative influ-
ence. The significant variables were  the number of non profits present in the municipali-
ties and the criminal hubs. The presence of cultural sites is not statistically significant in 
the allocation of funds to the criminal hubs, After the program the number of visitors and 
revenues from museum  and archeological sites of Calabria  lower than before while on av-
erage in Italy has had  a great increase. On the other hand tourism in Calabria expe-
rienced a differential increase , in spite of the waste of the funds of the European regional 
policy. 
KEYWORDS: cultural goods; tourism; public policies; public expenditure; South-
ern Italy. 
JEL Classification: H4; R1; Z1. 
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1. Introduction 
This study analyzes the negative performance of Calabria’s Regional Opera-
tion Program (POR) 2000-2006, devoted to projects for the enhancement 
of cultural goods to attract tourism, as an example of the waste of resources 
of European Union (EU) ambitious program 2000-2007 for the economic 
convergence of the less developed European regions with the developed 
ones (Community Support Framework-CSF 2000-2006). The results of this 
POR have been negative. The funds of 231 million euro, which would acti-
vate a similar amount of co-financing, have been dispersed on the territory 
in 546 projects. Notwithstanding, the meticulous procedures of selection of 
the projects, many of those approved resulted inefficient: a large share of 
the projects was abandoned before completion so that only a 63% of the 
funds allocated was spent. And the impact of the program , in spite of the 
importance of the resources mobilized, nearly 450 million of euro in a re-
gion with 2 million of residents, has been small or negative. And both the 
flow of visitors of the cultural sites and of tourists of Calabria have not 
been enhanced. We show, by statistical analysis, hat generally the variables 
that have determined the allocation of the funds have been incoherent with 
the proclaimed objectives of valorization of the cultural patrimony and 
promotion of tourism. 
The paper is divided in seven sections. Section 2 provides a brief survey 
of economic literature on this issue. Section 3 provides background infor-
mation on the POR 2000-2006 in Calabria. Section 4  gives an overview of 
the cultural heritage endowment  of  Calabria and of the implementation of 
the program. Section 5 presents the econometric methodology, the data set 
and the empirical results. Section 6 gives the concluding remarks and policy 
implications. Section 7 makes suggestions for future researches. 
 
2. A survey of literature 
In spite of the optimistic reports of the European Community, (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 2009), in the literature on the Euro-
pean Regional Policies for less developed regions, i.e. those of the so called 
Obiective 1 (Cini, 2003 and 2007) predominate the researches that demon-
strate disappointing results. Some authors argue that the results are poor in 
the case of regions with weak institutions  and better in the other cases. But 
the regions for whom the financial aid is justifiable are the less developed. 
And the weakness of the institutions is one of the main characters of the 
On the failure of European planning for less developed regions. The case of Calabria 
FORTE – MAGAZZINO – MANTOVANI 
 
 - 3 - 
 
less developed regions belonging to developed European countries. Basile, 
De Nardis, and Girardi (2001) demonstrate that in spite of the huge amount 
of public aid to the poor regions of EU, the distribution of income, labour 
productivity and employment rates does not show a positive relation with 
the allocation of the EU structural regional funds, particularly in the Nine-
ties. Boldrin and Canova (2001), argue that to a large degree these policies 
operated mostly as transfer with redistributive or assistance purpose rather 
than serving as agents to simulate or increase growth. Puga (2002) observe 
that, in spite of the large expenditures on European regional policies, the 
disparities remained or even widened, mainly because of factors connected 
with the location theory so that more emphasis should be put on the trans-
port structures improvement. Rodriguez Pose and Fratesi (2003), show that 
the returns to the investments in infrastructures and business support were 
not significant and that only investment in education and human capital had 
medium term positive and significant returns. Ederveen, De Groot, Nahuis 
(2006) show that European structural funds were very largely ineffective, in 
reducing the regional disparities, with the exception of the regions were in-
stitutions are of high quality. Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2006 and 2007) main-
tain that generally (non only in Europe) the policies to promote regional de-
velopment very often have had disappointing results and connect them with 
the weakness of the institutions. In this case targeted policies create rents 
that attract rent seekers, so that broad base policies would be more appro-
priate. The targeted plans should be adopted for the regions with strong in-
stitutions. The first part of the conclusion seems reasonable. Nevertheless, 
the second part is unconvincing. Indeed where the institutions work well it 
seem better to apply the general rules of competition of the European Un-
ion and leave to the market economy business to decide in which sectors to 
make use of the subsidies supposedly given to compensate for the regional 
global externalities (Van der Beek, 2004). 
A less drastic point of view is that of Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, 
and Verspagen (2003) who argue that EU regional policies had significant 
and positive impact on growth of European less developed regions and that 
the effects are much better in more developed environment. It follows the 
suggestion of improving the competence of the receiving environment 
which appears rather naïve considering that environment cannot be changed 
as long as remain the traditional social structures. Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 
(2005) argue that the structural regional funds of EU have had a positive ef-
fect in the case of the poor countries as Greece and add that the less clean 
countries (i.e. those more corrupt) did not gain less economic growth from 
the structural funds. They add that many of those who receive the structural 
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funds are not really eligible and therefore use them inefficiently. In the Ital-
ian economic literature – Giannola and Imbriani (eds., 2003), Lo Cicero and 
Reganati (2003), Viesti (2003), Viesti (2009), Viesti and Prota (2009) – there 
is a widespread consensus on the fact that the Italian public interventions 
for the development of Southern Italy have, in a large part, failed to reduce 
the disparities between Centre-North and South, and on the fact that the 
Regional funds did not obtained their objectives. This has happened both 
because due to the complexity of the procedures and to other factors, a 
relevant a share of the funds was not allocated before the time limit and was 
diverted to other end, and because the share of the funds that was utilized 
under the prescribed procedures was not allocated properly. 
On the other hand  Loddo (2006) with a simplified econometric analysis 
argues that in Italy, in the period 1994-2004, the poorer regions have caught 
up with the richer regions and that the European structural funds had a role 
in this convergence. However, agricultural funds had only a transitory posi-
tive effect while the resources allocated had dubious effects as from the dis-
tributional point of view and for the support of employment, education and 
the human capital. But V&V and LSE (2007) shows that in the period 2000-
2001 the regions of Southern Italy of Objective 1 have grown at the rate of 
1.23% per year while those of the Centre-North have grown at a 1.24% 
rate, while EU 15 gas grown at the 1.96%. Similar results appear in Svimez 
(2009), and Svimez (2010). While, Cancelo, Faína, and López-Rodríguez 
(2009) maintain that EU regional funds have been effective in promoting 
growth in the case of Galicia, a Spanish peripheral region of Objective 1. 
Borbalá-Szabó (2007) instead maintains that in Hungary the impact of the 
EU regional policies on economic growth has been disappointing. Ederveen 
and Gorter (2002), Edereveen, de Mooji, Gorter, and Nahuis (2002), and 
Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006) extensive econometric analysis 
show mixed results both from the distributive and the growth point of view 
and add that the impact of these policies on the national policies to reduce 
regional disparities has been negative. Tugores (2008), considering the EU-
15 global macroeconomic results, concludes that the contribution of EU re-
gional policy to the convergence among states is unquestionable for Spain 
and that has been a factor of the high growth of Ireland. But that there has 
not been generally a narrowing among regions inside the states. The critical 
issues are the possible distortions as for the efficient assignment of re-
sources and the risk that the resources placed at service of cohesion may 
wind up in the hands of specific interests. 
This point leads to the consideration of rent seeking, in the terms of 
Krueger (1974) for less developed economies, where rent seeking is the 
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substitute to the missing stimulus to profit seeking. On rent seeking in EU 
regional policies see also Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2006) and Bjorvatn and 
Coniglio (2007). Outside EU, for rent seeking as a negative phenomenon in 
regional policies, see Zaostrovtsev (2003) for Russia, Dreger, Rahmani, and 
Eckey (2007) for Iran, Fisher (2006) for Africa. Golley (2007) reaches mixed 
conclusions as for the Chinese regional policies. On the rich literature on 
rent seeking after the seminal works of Buchanan, Tullock, and Niskanen 
see, more generally, for all Cogleton, Hillman, and Konrad (eds., 2008). 
In the specialized economic literature on cultural goods and on tourism 
there are several contributions that emphasize the importance of the cul-
tural goods as attractors of flows of tourism. See, for example, Goldoni, 
Rispoli, and Troncon (eds., 2006), Colbert (2000), Kotler and Scott (1998), 
Nantel and Colbert (1992), Grossi and Debbia (eds., 1998), Diggles (1986), 
Hirshmann (1983). More generally, see Forte and Mantovani (2004), and 
Cooper et al. (1998). 
On the specific theme of this research, the Regional funds policies in the 
area of cultural goods and the development of tourism in Southern Italy, 
the literature is not equally developed. See however Spadaro (ed., 2010), 
Mantovani (2010), V&V and LSE (2007), and Ferrari and Cariola (2001). 
 
3. Description of Calabria’s Operational Regional Program (POR) for 
the cultural goods as attractors of tourism 
In any region of the European Regional Program 2000-2006 regarding Ob-
jective 1 (i.e. the less developed European regions), 50% of the funds of the 
Operational Regional Program came from the European Community. A 
share of 60% of them came from the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF), which finances productive investment and infrastructure 
projects in European Union regions. Another 20% came from the Euro-
pean Agriculture Guidance and Development Fund (EAGGF). The remain-
ing 20% came from the European Social Fund (ESF)for 19.6% and for 
0.94% from Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). The 
country receiving the European aid, in this case Italy, funds the remaining 
50%. Of it about 80% is financed by the Central Government and the re-
maining 20% by the Regions and Local Governments, in our case by Cala-
bria’s Regional government and to a small extent from the municipalities. 
On the other hand, to receive this money for their project, the  private enti-
ties that apply for the European financing, must be ready to co finance  at 
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least 50% of the costs. Public entities as for their projects relating to public 
services  are not obliged to co-financing. 
Calabria’s Operational Regional Program (POR) 2000-2006, to pursue 
the European guidelines, has been articulated into six subprograms, deno-
minated as “Axes”: 
 
Axis 1 - Enhancement of natural and environmental resources. 
Axis 2 - Use of local cultural and historical resources. 
Axis 3 - Human resource development. 
Axis 4 - Expansion and enhancement of local systems development. 
Axis 5 - Improving the quality of cities, local institutions and social life. 
Axis 6 - Strengthening of networks and service nodes. 
 
Axis 2, which is the object of our research, had an endowment of 231 
million euro, and could mobilized additional resources of similar amount, so 
that the total import of the project could be 450 million Euro. It was subdi-
vided in three “measures” pertaining to different kinds of projects, classified 
by their nature and by that of the subjects entitled to receive the funds. 
 
Measure 2.1 - Interventions for the preservation and enhancement of cultural heritage. 
Measure 2.2 - Public services for the enhancement of cultural heritage. 
Measure 2.3 - Developing entrepreneurial initiatives in the field of cultural heritage. 
 
Measures 2.1 was reserved to projects of public entities while measure 
2.3 was reserved to entrepreneurs. Both were administered by the Regional 
Department of Tourism because the projects, officially, had to be judged 
from the point of view of the enhancement of tourism. Cultural tourism is 
very important for the national Italian economy, but up to this point it has 
had a very limited role in Calabria. Yet, its main archeological sites, mu-
seums and monuments are extremely important at the international level. It 
has seven important archaeological parks: Sybaris, Capo Colonna, Solacium, 
Locri and Monasterace and a major Archeological Museum in Reggio Cala-
bria. In addition, has an extremely interesting “defensive system”, consisting 
of castles and towers built by the Normans and others from the ninth cen-
tury B.C. Project funds for development of entrepreneurial initiatives are 
granted within the limits of the de minimis rule. So that they must be small 
and the dispersion of the funds is inherent to this part of the program. 
The program has been constructed in a “gothic style”, by four goals, five 
programmatic strategies for each goal and seven specific action, each articu-
late in a number of sub-actions. The sum allocated, 231 million Euro, even 
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considering that the amount of funds mobilized was nearly the double, were 
a large amount for Calabria, but per se could hardly justify the complex arti-
culation of the plan. On the other hand, from this construct did not 
emerged clearly defined priorities. 
The four goals are described in an emphatic and vague language as fol-
lows. 
a) Construction of networks for the enjoyment of cultural and histori-
cal heritage, in accordance with already planned network initiatives, 
and to identify meaningful property at the regional level on which to 
focus project resources in order to conserve, protect, and enhance. 
b) Generate managerial services of both public institutions and private 
entrepreneurs to meet the demand of residents and tourist for cul-
tural heritage resources. 
c) Qualify and support the training of technical and scientific figures 
tied to the heritage and cultural tourism sector, primarily for cultural 
management (organization of cultural institutions and utility com-
panies) and management services for the dissemination of local 
knowledge (tour services). 
d) Develop companies and organizations (public and private, profit 
and non-profit, cultural foundations) relating to the conservation, 
enhancement, and management of the development of services that 
combine the benefits of tourism with cultural resources. 
 
Each of the four goals has to be implemented by the following five pro-
gram strategies: 
a) Concentrating resources around cultural emergencies, identified as 
key exploitable resources, while preserving and restoring heritage 
buildings, archeological site, and geographical landscapes. 
b) Enhance regional cultural identities through the wide range of arts, 
entertainment, and culture for social and economic development. 
c) Provide the region with infrastructure resources, such as physical re-
sources, techniques, methods of intervention, advanced services, 
and other “horizontal” factors such a knowledge and training of cul-
tural heritage. 
d) Create an interconnected function system to strengthen the cultural 
whole (the network of archeological areas, coastal castles, regional 
libraries, etc.). 
e) Fostering entrepreneurship in innovated private management ser-
vices that specialize in the integration between tourism and cultural 
heritage. 
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The four program objectives articulated in five program strategies must 
be realized by seven types of actions. 
 
a) Enhancement of the archeological heritage of Ancient Greece. 
b) Establish a network of archeology of the Magna Graecia region for 
the management, enhancement, and protection of archaeological 
sites and archaeological museums. In particular, the enhancement of 
the archaeological site of Sybaris is of primary importance. 
c) Create theme parks related to archaeological sites through the con-
struction of adequate facilities for their use1. 
d) Recovery, development, and reutilization of the most valuable ele-
ments of architectural and landscape heritage (both public and pri-
vate) for the purpose of establishing infrastructure and equipment 
aimed at improving and promoting architectural heritage for culture, 
tourism, local craft, and publishing. 
e) Redevelopment of historic centers through the recycling of aban-
doned buildings for the purpose of cultural tourism, and promoting 
news business activities in the sector of cultural heritage. 
f) Construction of multipurpose centers for the integration of cultural 
activities and entertainment. These centers must be located in build-
ings restored as part of the architectural heritage priority. 
g) Protection of the landscape through projects aimed at recovery and 
enhancement of the landscape in both areas of high valued cultural 
heritage and in areas with projects planned by the regional ecological 
network2. 
 
Each action must take in consideration the following six sub-actions. 
 
1. Promotion and implementation of innovative initiatives that en-
hance the cultural heritage and local identities. 
2. Events of significant cultural and anthropological value. 
3. Preserving ethnic minorities who have maintained important fea-
                                                 
1 These three actions must be accomplished through: 
1. Feasibility studies and implementation projects. 
2. Rehabilitation of archeological sites and the restoration of museums and artifacts. 
3. Assistance for the construction of infrastructure and facilities. 
4. Architectural Heritage and Landscape. 
2 This measure supports the implementation of initiatives of national importance and 
visibility, realized by partnerships of public and private agencies that promote cultural her-
itage regional and local identities, to attract flows of cultural tourism. 
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tures of the cultures of origin. 
4. Activities related to the ancient tradition of craft production, music, 
the production of objects of culture of pastoral farmers, and local 
foods. 
5. Preserving oral traditions. 
6. Promotion and creation of cultural networks. 
 
With a program built in this way, it was possible for the bureaucracy and 
the politicians to make any choice, by referring to some of the paragraphs 
of the “economic plan”. And the finely targeted economic plan became a 
discretionary program without any priority. 
 
4. Overview of the Cultural Heritage Endowment of Calabria and of 
the implementation of the program 
Doubtless, Calabria is rich of cultural goods as many other Italian regions. 
In the region the Ministry of Artistic and Cultural Goods (MIBAC) main-
tains 57 archeological sites on over 4,000 hectares of land with nine manag-
ing superintendants. There are 19 museums that house art, history, and im-
portant monuments. Of these, only five require an admission fee, and 
among them the National Archeological Museum of Reggio Calabria which 
has historically maintained the highest number of visitors. 
The majority of sites are in the provinces of Cosenza and Reggio Cala-
bria with 14 and 12, respectively. In addition, there are 27 historically signif-
icant sites consisting of constructions in historical towns. Of them, 9 are 
still not officially protected. The remaining 18 historically significant sites 
consisting of historical buildings and ruins have been object of registration 
for their protection. 
As mentioned above, the most important historical sites consisting of 
buildings or ruins. in Calabria are the “defensive systems” made of  towers, 
fortresses and castles dating from the ninth century A.C. mostly located on 
hilltops and near the sea. There are 147 castles, 196 towers, and 43 fortified 
structures officially recorded and protected. But only few of them are really 
preserved. 
Officially in Calabria there are 35 “theaters”: 80% are privately owned 
and conducted by cooperatives (50%), associations (20%), and private 
companies (30%). But the only culturally relevant theater is that of Reggio 
Calabria. 
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In some areas there are ethnic minorities (i.e. Albanians, Hellenistic, Oc-
citan, and Gypsies) who have retained important features of their cultures 
of origins. 
The multiplicity of cultural goods of Calabria may be disorienting. How-
ever it is easy to individuate the most important of them, by referring to the 
national classification of the important museums, archeological sites and 
monuments (inclusive of churches) done by the Ministry of Artistic and 
Cultural Goods. This classification may appears restrictive as for the histori-
cal buildings. We have broadened the list of the major cultural sites of Cala-
bria by including all the castles still preserved. Then we have added to the 
list the Lyric Theater of Reggio Calabria, the only important theater of the 
region and the cultural center entitled to Corrado Alvaro, the most famous 
writer of Calabria. 
A year after the expiration of the programs, the three Axes relating to 
culture had a relatively better achievement in comparison with the other 
axes of the POR, but they were still very satisfactory. Axis II had an 
achievement ratio of about as for the fund allocated 50% like Axis V (Social 
and City Life), and Axis VI (Networks). The program for natural and envi-
ronmental resources (Axis I), for which Calabria has a natural vocation, has 
a ratio of only 45%. Local systems for development (Axis IV) had a ration 
lower than 25% and human resources lower than 5%. 
At its termination  the  Cultural POR had allocated 63.4% of the availa-
ble resources. But a share of the project financed was abandoned before 
completion. We here consider the situation in 2007, as resulting by the offi-
cial accounting at the end of  February 2008, when 50% of the funds, as 
said was allocated, 46,3% was “committed”, and of them 82% was really 
spent. Considering that then 546 projects had been approved and in execu-
tion or abandoned, each of them had an average amount of 190.00 euro. 
With the co-financing, an average investment project had a value of 380 Eu-
ro, clearly a dispersion of funds in initiatives with a minimal impact on the 
valorization of Calabria’s important cultural patrimony. 
There were only 3 projects exceeding 5 million Euro. They were for the 
two archeological parks of Solacium in Crotone and the plaster cast and pic-
ture gallery in Catanzaro. In the 3 to 5 million Euro category there were 
four projects for the restoration of historic buildings and the structural ad-
justment of the National Museum of Cosenza, and there was an appropria-
tion of 3 million Euro for the promotion of demo-ethno-anthropological 
heritage. 
Only 25 projects approved had budgets from 1 to 3 million Euro. 
Among them two projects for the preservation of the Albanian traditions 
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and the creation of network designed to enhance minority languages. 
Projects with a budget of 500 thousand euro were almost exclusively dedi-
cated to construction and restoration of buildings. 
Most projects were in the range between 1 and 250 thousand euro for in-
terventions as library systems, consolidation of buildings and churches, the 
promotion of crafts in the process of “extinction” such as tailors, carpen-
ters, goldsmiths. The number of projects unfinished at the end of 2007 was 
60.7% of the total. The complexity of the procedures and the fragmentation 
of the expenditure in small project resulted in a large proportion of unfi-
nished projects, seven years after the beginning of the plan. And a share of 
them has been abandoned before the completion. 
 
Table 1 – Per capita amounts, POR Calabria 2000-2006. 
Provinces Number of 
projects 
Share of projects Share of 
population 
Cosenza 209 37.5 36.5 
Reggio Calabria 157 28.5 28.1 
Catanzaro 94 16.9 18.3 
Crotone 51 9.1 8.6 
Vibo Valentia 45 8.1 8.4 
Source: POR Calabria (2009). 
 
As one can see form Table 1, the distribution of the 556 projects by 
provinces follows closely the provincial distribution of the population, so 
that one can guess that the voting weight of each province determined the 
number of projects assigned to it. The fact that the  presidents of the centre 
right regional Government in power until 2004 and the president of the 
successive centre left Government were respectively of the provinces of 
Cosenza (Chiaravalloti) and Catanzaro (Loiero) did not affect substantially 
the distribution of projects by provinces. 
Nor the distribution among the provinces was affected by the different 
importance of their cultural goods per se or as attractor of tourism and by 
the different needs of valorization of them. The criterion that prevailed, 
among the provinces, was that of the distribution of the funds in propor-
tion to their electors. 
 
5. Econometric methodology, data and empirical results 
In this section we show statistical and econometric analysis results to shed 
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light on variables that determined the POR 2000-2006 Axis II fund alloca-
tion. The dependent variables considered are the number of projects and 
the amount of Euro allocated. 
In Table 2 some preliminary descriptive statistics are shown. 
 
Table 2 – Exploratory data analysis. 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Range 
lnamounts_pc 4.3061 4.5545 1.7295 -0.4602 3.1263 9.4483 
lnpayments_pc 4.0135 4.1609 1.6979 -0.3040 2.9617 9.0586 
lncommitment_pc 4.2685 4.5367 1.7243 -0.4921 3.2440 9.5749 
Projects 2.5524 1 3.6953 5.5770 41.9537 35 
Votes 53.9711 54.0975 6.3680 -0.0132 4.3171 47.0650 
Nonprofits 25.1667 10 73.2106 6.5077 47.9020 656 
Province 0.0238 0 0.1528 6.2470 40.0244 1 
Health structures 0.4619 0 0.4997 0.1528 1.0234 1 
University 0.0762 0 0.2659 3.1949 11.2075 1 
Nursery 0.3048 0 0.4614 0.8483 1.7196 1 
Primary school 0.3238 0 0.4690 0.7531 1.5671 1 
Secondary school 0.8524 1 0.3556 -1.9868 4.9474 1 
Senior high school 0.3571 0 0.4803 0.5963 1.3556 1 
T&C 0.0762 0 0.2659 3.1949 11.2075 1 
Touristic attractors 0.2810 0 0.4505 0.9747 1.9501 1 
TV&R 0.1952 0 0.3973 1.5377 3.3646 1 
Soccer 0.0381 0 0.1919 4.8259 24.2896 1 
A&C&A 0.7381 1 0.4407 -1.0831 2.1730 1 
A&P 0.0524 0 0.2233 4.0182 17.1462 1 
L&P 0.4762 0 0.5006 0.0953 1.0091 1 
Museums 0.2048 0 0.4045 1.4633 3.1412 1 
Cultural sites 0.1143 0 0.3189 2.4247 6.8790 1 
Criminal hubs 0.2571 0 0.4381 1.1113 2.2350 1 
Councillor 0.0714 0 0.2582 3.3282 12.0769 1 
Sources: our calculations. 
 
The tested projects – those of POR 2000-2006 Axes II as resulting from 
the regional Report of 29 February 2008 referring to end of 2007 3 – were 
considered “non Continuous” projects, which means they had a specific 
end date. This specification allowed for simplified testing and analysis. The 
dataset, is reported in Appendix to Forte, Magazzino, Mantovani, and Skepis 
(2010) and is synthesized in Table 2 and in various Tables in the Appendix. 
Statistical analysis was conducted only for cross-section containing muni-
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cipals that received POR funds. The focus on the amount per-capita in mu-
nicipalities that received projects allows us to examine which priorities if any 
have been pursued in allocating the funds among them. We constructed a 
dataset to analyze the relation of the data about the projects in per capita 
amount in the various municipalities and the variables described below re-
garding these municipalities. 
A variety of regression techniques were used. First, we ran a Stepwise re-
gression, always concentrating on the per-capita amounts, i.e. on the muni-
cipalities that received funds4. 
Afterwards, we ran a GLM model5. In particular, these estimators permit 
us to estimate GLM-like models involving mean-variance specifications that 
extend beyond those for known exponential family distributions, and to es-
timate models where the mean-variance specification is of exponential fami-
ly form, but the observed data do not satisfy the distributional requirements 
(Agresti, 1990)6. 
As a third method of estimate, we choose a Robust regression7. Finally, 
                                                 
4 Stepwise methods provide ways to automate the process of model selection. They 
work either by subtracting predictors from a complicated model, or by adding predictors to 
a simpler one according to some pre-set statistical criteria. Stepwise methods cannot con-
sider the substantive or theoretical implications of their choices, nor can they do much 
troubleshooting to evaluate possible weakness in the models produced at each step. They 
produce badly biased models in many instances due to over-fitting. Despite their well-
known limitations, stepwise methods meet some practical needs and have been widely 
used. 
5 Nelder and McCullagh (1989) describe a class of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) that 
extends linear regression to permit non-normal stochastic and non-linear systematic com-
ponents. GLMs encompass a broad and empirically useful range of specifications that in-
cludes linear regression, logistic and probit analysis, and Poisson models. 
Crucially, the properties of the GLM maximum likelihood estimator depend only on 
these two moments. Thus, a GLM specification is principally a vehicle for specifying a 
mean and variance, where the mean is determined by the link assumption, and the mean-
variance relationship is governed by the distributional assumption. In this respect, the dis-
tributional assumption of the standard GLM is overly restrictive. McCullagh (1983) offers a 
full set of distributional results for the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator that 
mirror those for ordinary maximum likelihood. 
6 Alternately, Gourioux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) show that consistency of the 
GLM maximum likelihood estimator requires only correct specification of the conditional 
mean. Misspecification of the variance relationship does, however, lead to invalid inference, 
though this may be corrected using robust coefficient covariance estimation. In contrast to 
the QML results, the robust covariance correction does not require correction specification 
of a GLM conditional variance. 
7 An Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRLS) procedure obtains robust regression esti-
mates. The first iteration begins with OLS. Any observations so influential as to have 
Cook’s distance D values greater than 1 are automatically set aside after this first step. 
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we estimated a quantile regression8. 
We choose the log-linear functional form, and our dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of per capita amounts (lnamounts_pc), and it represents 
POR funds of each municipality, divided for its population. Projects is the 
number of approved projects; Votes is the electoral flows; Nonprofit is the 
number of nonprofit organizations of any kind of the given municipality; 
Province is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if municipal is a Province, and 
equal to 0 otherwise; Health structures is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 
if in the municipal area insists at least one hospital, a nuthouse or a fitness 
centre, and equal to 0 otherwise; University is a dummy variable, that is equal 
to 1 if in the municipal area there is an academic institution, and equal to 0 
otherwise; Nursery is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if the municipality 
has got a nursery, and equal to 0 otherwise; Primary school is a dummy varia-
ble, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area there is at least one primary 
school, and equal to 0 otherwise; Secondary school is a dummy variable, that is 
equal to 1 if in the municipal area there is at least one secondary school, and 
equal to 0 otherwise; Senior high school is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 
if in the municipal area there is at least one senior high school, and equal to 
0 otherwise; T&C is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal 
area there is at least one theatre or a cinema, and equal to 0 otherwise; Tou-
ristic attractors is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area 
there is at least one disco, aquapark, wine-tasting shop, sport-centre, or a 
beach, and equal to 0 otherwise; TV&R is a dummy variable, that is equal 
to 1 if in the municipal area there is at least one local TV or radio station, 
and equal to 0 otherwise; Soccer is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in 
the municipal area there is at least one professional soccer team, and equal 
to 0 otherwise; A&C&A is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the 
municipal area there is at least one hotel, camping or farm holidays, and 
equal to 0 otherwise; A&P is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the 
municipal area there is at least one airport or seaport, and equal to 0 other-
wise; L&P is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area 
                                                                                                                       
Next, weights are calculated for each observation using a Huber function (which down-
weights observations that have larger residuals) and weighted least squares is performed. 
After several WLS iterations, the weight function shifts to a Tukey biweight (as suggested 
by Li, 1985), tuned for 95% Gaussian efficiency (Street, Carroll, and Ruppert, 1988; Hamil-
ton 1992). 
8 As originally proposed by Koenker and Baxistt (1978), quantile regression provides 
estimates of the linear relationship between X regressors and a specified quantile of the de-
pendent variable Y. One important special case of quantile regression is the Least Absolute 
Deviations (LAD) estimator, which corresponds to fitting the conditional median of the re-
sponse variable. 
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there is at least one library or local publisher, and equal to 0 otherwise; Mu-
seums is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area there is 
at least one museum, and equal to 0 otherwise; Cultural sites is a dummy va-
riable, that is equal to 1 if the municipality might be considered as a cultural 
hubs (see Table E in Appendix) and equal to 0 otherwise; Criminal hubs is a 
dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if the municipality might be considered as 
a criminal hub according to Gratteri and Nicaso (2007) classification, and 
equal to 0 otherwise (see Table D in Appendix); Councillor is a dummy varia-
ble, that is equal to 1 if the municipality has been represented by a council-
lor as a member of Regional Government during the period 2000-2006, and 
equal to 0 otherwise. 
As is shown in Table 3, first of all one notices that there are very few dif-
ferences in the estimated coefficients among four estimation methods ap-
plied; in fact, the coefficients are very similar, while standard errors present 
slight variations. Second column represents the output of Stepwise Back-
ward Robust OLS estimate. Recall that we choose the log-linear functional 
form, and our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of per-capita 
amounts (lnamounts_pc). In order to control for heteroscedasticity, we ap-
plied White’s correction. 
About regression analysis, as expected, the number of total projects 
(Projects) is statistically significant, and this explanatory variable tends to have 
a positive influence on per capita amounts of the individual municipalities. 
The presence of museums in the considered municipalities is not relevant 
for the allocation of funds per capita. Nor it is relevant the presence of im-
portant cultural sites. Also the presence of schools, whether of primary or 
secondary education does not seem relevant, while the presence of senior 
high schools is relevant with a negative impact. It seems that because in 
these municipalities there is already some important public cultural institu-
tions they do not need attention as for the allocation of POR’ s funds for 
culture. A similar consideration may explain the L&P’s negative influence 
on the allocation of these funds. Touristic attractors, tend to have a negative 
impact on dependent variable, too. On the other hand one should notice 
that they are not significant in the LAD estimate. The variables TV&R, 
A&C&A and A&P too which may be relevant for tourism are not signifi-
cant. On balance, one can argue that the presence of relevant touristic facili-
ties and services does not exert an appreciable influence on the allocation of 
Calabria’s POR’ funds for culture, even if the development of tourism is 
among the official objectives of the program. The presence of an academic 
institution (University) increase the funds assigned. This result might evi-
dence that where there is a University the capability of presenting projects 
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apt to be approved tends to increase, likely because of the greater compe-
tence and intellectual prestige of their authors. On the other hand one must 
notice that in LAD estimate University is not significant and that in IRLS es-
timate the explanatory variable University doesn’t have a statistical relevance. 
This result implies that the presence of an University in a given town it is 
not important in the policy of the Region as for the allocation of the POR’ 
cultural funds. As previously seen there is a strong correlation between the 
presence of nonprofits and the allocation of funds to the municipalities. 
Those with nonprofit institutions have been favored on those without 
them. However, the variable Nonprofit shows a negative incidence on the per 
capita amount of the projects as for municipalities which received funds. 
One can explain this result arguing that the competition between the differ-
ent nonprofit organizations for these public funds has reduced the success 
of them. A similar consideration may be done as for the criminal hubs. 
They have been preferred over the other municipalities but they are not sig-
nificant as for the per capita allocation of the funds. The difference of this 
result with that relating to nonprofits may be explained considering that the 
considered criminal organizations are oligopolistic groups and not numer-
ous, small imperfect competition enterprises as most of the Calabria’s non-
profits. 
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Number of obs. 210 210 209 210 
F test 43.70 
(.0000) 
 45.19  
Log-Likelihood -321.0666    
Pearson 
Dispersion 
 1.295   
R2 .5874  .5731  
R2adj .5834  .5604  
Pseudo R2    .3385 
BIC 684.9101 -818.4658   
AIC 658.1332    
RMSE 1.1381  1.1462  
Ramsey OV test 2.03 
(.1107) 
   
Mean VIF 2.52    













(.6134) (.6134) (.0160) (.0486) 
Shapiro-Wilk test (.5947) (.5947) (.0246) (.0360) 
IQR 1 mild outlier 
0 severe outlier 
1 mild outlier 
0 severe outlier 
3 mild outliers 
0 severe outlier 
9 mild outliers 
0 severe outlier 






 f.v. significant 
(f.v.)2 not 
significant 
Notes: a: White correction for heteroskedasticity applied. Significance levels: * 10%, 
** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in brackets. 
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6. Impact of Calabria’s POR projects for culture on cultural sites and 
on tourism 
The POR funds for cultural investments finalized to development of tour-
ism, as the statistical analysis has shown, have been mostly dispersed to 
purposes different from the valorization of the important cultural sites of 
the region, without any consideration of priorities. This POR might have 
even harmed the promotion of Calabria’s cultural sites, because the unfi-
nished projects are a high percentage. Moreover the Central government 
budget may have overlooked Calabria’s cultural sites, assuming that of them 
would take care the special budget of POR. 
In 2000, the year of initial funding of POR, museums in Calabria at-
tracted 239,000 visitors of which 59% were of free admissions and the paid 
admissions amounted to 322,000 Euro, with an 1,5 euro for visitor. Archeo-
logical sites had 139,000 visitors. The flow of visitors to the archaeological 
sites in 2007 has been 87,600 from 139,000 of year 2000 with a loss of 37%. 
Reggio Calabria Archelogical Museum remained the most visited site with 
55,700 visitors (from 87,200 in 2000) with a loss of 36% higher than that of 
visitors. The average paying visitor left 1.27 Euro in 2007. On the other 
hand the percentage of non-paying visitors increased from 59% to 61%9. 
The flow of visitors to the archaeological sites in 2007 has been 87,600 
from 115,5 of year  2000 with a loss of 31%. The Archelogical Museum of 
Reggio Calabria remained the most visited site with 55,700 visitors (from 
87,200 in 2000) with a loss of 36%. 
On a positive note, the revenue in per unit sold of additional services 
and goods (bookshop, restaurant, guided tours, etc.) is higher than the na-
tional average. In fact there are gross receipts in the region of 240,400 Euro 
in 35,400 transactions. This is an average of 6.8 Euro, which is higher than 
the national average of 4.7 Euro. It is worth noting that from 20,000 visits 
only 1,800 Euro arose from the in-house cafeterias and 38,000 Euro from 
the restaurants. This means that visitors purchased items from the gift-
shops that were of a higher price on average to make up for the final reve-
nues. There is evidence, in fact, of highly quality books, and merchandising 
being sold in the shops. This shows that visitors have spending power and 
that, if stimulated, will buy gift-shop items. It should be emphasized that 
this positive sector is managed by the private firms. 
                                                 
9 The “free lunch” of cultural sites in Calabria is not copied in other regions of Italy, in 
which the majority of cultural sites require payment for admission. To put simply, their 
earnings are substantial. Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Umbria, and Puglia all display this 
pay-dominate policy, and success in cultural heritage has followed suit. 
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In Italy in 2000 visitors of museums and monuments  were approximate-
ly 30 million with a revenue of 77 million Euro. This resulted in an average 
of 2.5 Euro per visitor. In 2007, in Italy museums and monuments attracted 
34,443,097 visitors and produced gross revenues of 106,033,174.64 Euro 
with an average of 3 Euro per visitor. There is an increase on the flows of 
2000 of about 14% for the visitors and of more than 30% for the revenues. 
For the archeological sites and monuments  at the national level in 2007 in 
comparison with 2000 there has been an huge  increase of visitors of about 
268% from 6,1 million euro in 2000 to 16,4 million. The amount of revenue 
increased of 21% to 34.2 million euro from 28.2 million in 2000. 
The coexistence of these two divergent trends between Calabria and Italy 
shows that the POR for culture of Calabria missed the objective of attract-
ing new visitors to Calabria’s important cultural sites. 
And actually also the objective of connecting Calabria’s archeological 
sites in a unique system which appears among the objectives of the POR 
has not been realized. 
On the other hand tourism in Calabria between year 2000 and 2007 has 
experienced a great increase of arrivals (nearly 45%) and presences (nearly 
39%) , with a spectacular increase of those of the foreigners. Arrivals of the 
foreigners increased of 78,3% more than the double of those of the Italians 
who had an increase of 40%. The Italian trend too has been positive. How-
ever has been much less pronounced than that of Calabria both for the ar-
rivals and the presences, both of the foreigners and of the Italians. Arrivals, 
in Italy as a whole had an increase of 20.4% ,less than half of Calabria’s per-
centage. Presences increased by 11.1% .i.e. less than one third of Calabria’s 
percentage. The arrivals of the foreigners, in Italy as a whole, in the consi-
dered period increased by 20%, about a quarter of Calabria’s percentage. 
The arrivals of the Italians increase by 18.6%, slightly less than half Cala-
bria’s percentage. Considering that in the same period the visitors of the 
cultural sites of Calabria did diminish substantially one can argue that the 
great increase of the flow of tourists, and particularly of foreign tourists to 
Calabria was due to reasons different from the attractiveness of its cultural 
sites. And Calabria’s POR 2000-2006 which had been conceived the en-
hancement of the cultural sites as an important factor for the development 
of tourism, has been irrelevant or negative from  this point of view. 
 
7. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
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Most researches on the effectiveness of the European Regional Programs 
for the convergence of the less developed regions analyze the issue by con-
necting the execution of these programs to the economic performance of 
these regions. These researches, generally, conclude that the programs did 
not have satisfactory results, from the growth point of view, except in par-
ticular cases. These researches, however interesting, are mostly macroeco-
nomics. They do not focus on the structure and performance of these plans 
and of the resulting projects. Here we consider the specific Regional Opera-
tional Program of Calabria 2000-2006, in the area of valorization of cultural 
goods for the development of tourism, showing that its complex targeted 
structure, with its apparent rigorousness, allowed a discretionary behavior of 
the politicians and of the bureaucracy in charge of its execution. The result 
was a proliferation of projects that did not pursue any priority and that in a 
large proportion remained uncompleted, so that only 63 of the available 
funds was spent for the program. One might ask why the bureaucracy and 
politicians accepted an outcome that seems to contrast with their interest to 
maximize their budgets, according to the well known “Niskanen’s theo-
rem”. However, the sums unspent for this program – in accordance with a 
rule of the European Community – were utilized by Calabria’s Government 
to finance expenditures out of their ordinary budget, “coherent with POR”, 
thus increasing the funds available for their day-to-day administration. 
The results of our research for Calabria’s POR 2000-2006, coincides with 
the general results of the European Regional Programs 2000-2006 as ap-
plied in Italy. Indeed , as one can see in Appendix, only 55.5% of the 45.9 
billion Euro allocated for this program was spent for its projects. The re-
maining 44.5% was destined to coherent projects. They represent a share of 
34.7% of the value of the projects approved. The difference between the 
percentage of the value of the project approved and that of the funds un-
spent is explained by the fact that a share of the project approved remained 
unfinished so that part the money allocated to them was not disbursed. The 
analysis of the composition of the funds allocate to coherent project instead 
than to the European Regional Program for Sothern Italy shows that the 
highest percentage regards infrastructures and natural resources (mostly 
agriculture). The lowest percentage regards human resources and local sys-
tems. Clearly in these areas the pressure groups minimized the amount of 
funds unspent out of the European Development Programs. 
Our empirical analysis for Calabria’s case study, has shown that mostly 
reasons, connected with pressure groups, rather than cultural and touristic 
objectives explain the allocation of the funds. There is no significant statistic 
relation between the important cultural sites and the allocation of funds. 
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Further the regression with the project approved have shown that the pres-
ence of at least one museum is not significant, as for the allocation of funds 
per capita to the municipalities. Also the presence of schools, whether of 
primary of primary or secondary education does not seem relevant, while 
the presence of high schools is relevant, with a negative impact. It seems 
that because in these municipalities there is already some important public 
cultural institution they do not need attention as for the allocation of POR’ 
s funds for culture. A similar consideration may explain the L&P’s (libraries 
and publishers) negative influence on the allocation of these funds. The 
presence of an academic institution (University) increases the funds assigned. 
This result might evidence that were there is a University, the capability of 
presenting projects suited approval tends to increase, likely because of the 
greater competence and intellectual prestige of their authors. On the other 
hand, one can notice that in LAD estimates University is not significant and 
that in IRLS estimates the explanatory variable University doesn’t have a sta-
tistical relevance. Touristic attractors tend to have a negative impact on de-
pendent variable, too. Moreover, one should notice that they are not signifi-
cant in LAD estimates. The variables A&C&A (hotels, camping, farm-
holidays), TV&R (television and radio stations), and A&P (aero terminals 
and ports), which are relevant for tourism, are not significant. On balance, 
one can argue that tourism does not exert an appreciable influence on the 
allocation of Calabria’s POR funds for culture even if the development of 
tourism was among the official objectives of the program. Considering the 
flows of visitors and flows of euro paid by them to the cultural sites in 2000 
when the program was not yet started and in 2007 after its completion and 
it emerged that these flows, as for the museum and other sites considered in 
the official statistics decreased by 11% as for the visitors and by 16% for 
the revenues. The opposite happened in Italy, with an increase of about 
14% of the visitors and of nearly 30% for the revenues. For the major mu-
seums and  monuments inclusive of the major archeological sites as for Ca-
labria there was a dramatic decline, respectively of while for Italy as a whole 
threes was a small decline of 2,9% in the visitors and a big increase of 17.5 
in the aggregate revenue from the visits. 
On the other hand tourism in Calabria between year 2000 and 2007 has 
experienced a great increase of arrivals (nearly 45%) and presences (nearly 
39%), with a spectacular increase of 78.3% of those of the foreigners. Cala-
bria’s tourism thus did grow a rate much greater than the average Italian 
rate in spite of the failure of the POR for culture of operating as a stimulus 
to its growth. And one may therefore argue that these taxpayers’ s resources 
were wasted. 
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8. Suggestions for future researches 
Here we considered the European Policy for the development of the less 
developed regions via the Regional funds, focusing on Calabria as for the 
cultural sector with impact on tourism, which is potentially a very important 
axis for the development of Calabria and, more generally, for Southern Ita-
ly. What emerged was that the excess of targeted planning allowed a discre-
tionary behavior of the bureaucracy and of the politicians who inefficiency 
and lack of effectiveness and fostered the rent seeking. Some additional re-
search in this respect has been done in a parallel analysis by two of the 
present authors10, more specifically, as for the rent seeking practices, in 
connection with non-profit pressure groups and criminal organizations of 
mafia type. 
More generally there is a strong need for further detailed scientific re-
search on the allocation and impact of European Structural Funds, also in 
relation to the new convergence and cohesion Program 2007-2013. It is pa-
radoxical that on the one hand EU maintains that tax exemptions for the 
business the less developed regions of the community distort the market 
competition, while on the other hand, with the EU’s taxpayer money, fin-
ances projects supposedly promoting convergence and cohesion in these 
regions provided that they derive from a regional plan following EU plan-
ning guidelines. 
                                                 
10 See: Forte, Mantovani, and Skepys (2010). 
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Appendix 
Table A – Tourist’s flows in Calabria and in Italy (2000-2007). 
Presences 





ITALY 338,885,143 366,764,778 8% 376,641,751 11% 
CALABRIA 6,282,074 8,155,053 30% 8,731,335 39% 
Presences 





ITALY 140,356,985 156,861,341 12% 163,465,680 16% 
CALABRIA 882,837 1,479,247 68% 1,542,133 74% 
Arrivals 





ITALY 80,031,637 93,044,399 16% 96,150,083 20% 
CALABRIA 1,083,078 1,476,026 36% 1,568,519 45% 





ITALY 44,924,162 51,850,572 15% 53,276,961 19% 
CALABRIA 946,977 1,244,549 31% 1,325,825 40% 
Arrivals 





ITALY 35,107,475 41,193,827 17% 42,873,122 22% 
CALABRIA 136,101 231,477 70% 242,694 78% 
Source: MIBAC (2009). 
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Table B – Visitors for all museums, monuments, and archeological sites. 




























































Catanzaro 0 1 1 0 0 0 23,580 23,580 0.00 
Cosenza 1 5 6 9,595 15,347 24,942 31,215 56,157 18,733.96 
Crotone 1 1 2 2,945 8,231 11,176 9,000 20,176 5,541.58 
Reggio 
Calabria 4 4 8 76,762 119,252 196,014 63,160 259,174 281,947.25 
Vibo 
Valentia 1 1 2 8,398 7,652 16,050 3,439 19,489 16,379.95 
Calabria 7 12 19 97,700 150,482 248,182 130,394 378,576 322,602.74 
Italy 216 164 380 15,488,306 8,236,881 23,725,187 6,450,639 30,175,826 77,017,081.85 




























































Catanzaro 0 1 1 0 0 0 18,147 18,147 0.00 
Cosenza 1 4 5 5,951 8,722 14,673 32,668 47,341 11,401.00 
Crotone 1 0 1 2,686 5,936 8,622 0 8,622 5,192.00 
Reggio 
Calabria 4 3 7 67,664 91,066 158,730 50,109 208,839 243,344.00 
Vibo 
Valentia 1 1 2 5,861 8,172 14,033 2,844 16,877 10,759.00 
Calabria 7 9 16 82,162 113,896 196,058 103,768 299,826 270,696.00 
Italy 223 177 400 16,246,943 9,634,213 25,881,156 8,561,941 34,443,097 106,033,174.65 
Source: MIBAC (2009). 
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Table C – Visitors in archeological sites and monuments. 
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23,580  0.00 
Cosenza 0 
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2  0 0 0 
                       
19,800  
                         
19,800  0.00 
Crotone 0 
               
1  
              
1  0 0 0 
                         
9,000  
                          
9,000  0.00 
Reggio 
Calabria 
                
2  
           
4  
              
6  0 
                
24,099  
                
24,099  
                       
63,160  
                        
87,259  0.00 
Calabria 
          
2  
         
8  
         
10  0 
                
24,099  
                
24,099  
          
115,540  
           
139,639  0.00 
Italy 
        
76  
     
118  




   
3,778,561   10,745,550  
       
6,110,562  
      
16,856,112  28,245,726.30 
          























































             
0  
              
1  
              
1  
                           
0  0 0 
                      
23,580  
                        
23,580  0.00 
Cosenza 
                 
0 
           
1 1 0 0 0 
                       
19,800  
                         
19,800  0.00 
Crotone 
                 
0  
            
0  0 0 0 0 
                         
9,000  
                          
9,000  0.00 
Reggio 
Calabria 
                
2  
           
3 5 0 
                
5,625  5,625 
                       
63,160  
                        
87,259  No data 
Calabria 
          
2  
         
5  7 
                 
0  
                
5,625 5,625 
          
115,540  
           
139,639  No data 
Italy 
        
82  121 203 
  
4,918,258 3,320,598 8,238,856 
       
8,124,201 
      
16,363,057 34,237,406.84 
Source: MIBAC (2009). 
Notes: a: includes the share of revenues of the concessionaries. 
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Table D – Criminal Hubs. 





Africo (RC) 3,465 0 18 0 
Amantea (CS) 13,268 0 30 2 
Bagnara Calabra (RC) 11,230 0 34 1 
Bianco (RC) 4,047 0 16 0 
Botricello (CZ) 4,586 0 7 0 
Bova Marina (RC) 3,967 0 23 5 
Bova (RC) 474 0 6 7 
Bovalino (RC) 8,358 0 39 3 
Bruzzano Zeffirio (RC) 1,401 0 3 0 
Careri (RC) 2,443 0 4 0 
Casignana (RC) 775 0 3 1 
Cassano allo Ionio (CS) 17,565 2 37 5 
Castrovillari (CS) 22,389 0 78 3 
Catanzaro (CZ) 95,251 0 535 23 
Cetraro (CS) 10,333 0 19 0 
Cirò Marina (KR) 13,987 0 26 0 
Cittanova (RC) 10,675 0 27 0 
Condofuri (RC) 5,055 0 6 3 
Corigliano Calabro (CS) 38,241 1 71 3 
Cosenza (CS) 72,998 2 477 7 
Crotone (KR) 60,010 2 384 7 
Cutro (KR) 10,829 0 11 0 
Filadelfia (VV) 6,283 0 15 0 
Fuscaldo (CS) 8,323 0 25 2 
Galatro (RC) 2,307 0 2 0 
Gioia Tauro (RC) 17,762 0 55 1 
Gioiosa Ionica (RC) 7,044 0 21 2 
Guardavalle (CZ) 5,315 0 7 1 
Lamezia Terme (CZ) 70,501 1 228 7 
Laureana di Borrello (RC) 5,709 0 13 0 
Limbadi (VV) 3,630 0 4 0 
Locri (RC) 12,997 3 65 4 
Mammola (RC) 3,389 0 8 2 
Marina di Gioiosa 
Ionica (RC) 
6,440 0 19 0 
Melicucco (RC) 4,996 0 13 0 
Melito di Porto Salvo (RC) 10,506 0 39 4 
Mesoraca (KR) 7,125 0 20 1 
On the failure of European planning for less developed regions. The case of Calabria 
FORTE – MAGAZZINO – MANTOVANI 
 
 - 27 - 
 
Mileto (VV) 7,157 1 33 1 
Monasterace (RC) 3,426 1 16 1 
Montebello Ionico (RC) 6,922 0 16 0 
Oppido Mamertina (RC) 5,559 0 23 1 
Palizzi (RC) 2,709 0 12 1 
Palmi (RC) 19,435 1 45 5 
Paola (CS) 17,195 0 51 2 
Petilia Policastro (KR) 9,594 0 28 0 
Petronà (CZ) 3,010 0 5 0 
Platì (RC) 3,823 0 15 0 
Polistena (RC) 11,591 0 30 3 
Reggio di Calabria (RC) 180,353 3 656 17 
Rizziconi (RC) 7,650 0 25 0 
Rocca di Neto (KR) 5,614 0 13 0 
Roccella Ionica (RC) 6,762 0 33 2 
Roghudi (RC) 1,365 0 0 0 
Rosarno (RC) 15,051 0 15 0 
San Ferdinando (RC) 4,339 0 11 1 
San Gregorio d’Ippona (VV) 2,338 0 4 1 
San Lorenzo (RC) 3,357 0 8 1 
San Luca (RC) 4,106 0 7 0 
San Lucido (CS) 5,906 0 16 0 
Seminara (RC) 3,352 0 12 1 
Serra San Bruno (VV) 7,068 1 18 1 
Siderno (RC) 1,6734 0 34 2 
Sinopoli (RC) 2,329 0 3 0 
Soriano Calabro (VV) 3,068 0 14 1 
Staiti (RC) 395 0 3 0 
Stignano (RC) 1,373 0 1 0 
Stilo (RC) 2,816 1 7 1 
Strongoli (KR) 6,107 0 9 2 
Taurianova (RC) 15,799 0 30 0 
Vibo Valentia (VV) 33,957 2 155 6 
Villa San Giovanni (RC) 13,119 0 53 2 
Zungri (VV) 2,182 0 5 0 
Total 1,019,235 21 3,794 146 
Source: Gratteri and Nicaso (2006). 
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Table E – Cultural Sites Considered by Municipality and Province. 
 Cultural Site Municipality Province 
1 Archeological park of Scolacium BORGIA 
CATANZARO 
2 Archeological Museum of Lamezia 
(Neolithic) LAMEZIA TERME 
3 Norman Castle SQUILLACE 
4 State Archeological Museum AMENDOLARA 
COSENZA 
5 Archeological Park of Sibari CASSANO ALLO IONIO 
6 Sibarite’ s National Archeological 
Museum CASSANO ALLO IONIO 
7 National Gallery of Cosenza COSENZA 
8 Norman Swew Castle COSENZA 
9 Antiquarium of Scalea – 
Torre Cimalonga SCALEA 
10 Norman Castle CORIGLIANO 
11 Maritime Aragon Castle BELVEDERE 
12 Swew Castle ROSETO 
13 Pathirion ROSSANO 
CROTONE 
14 Nao Tower CROTONE 
15 National Archeological Museum CROTONE 
16 Le Castella ISOLA DI CAPO RIZZUTO 
17 Norman Castle SANTA SEVERINA 
18 Church of Saint Francis of Assisi GERACE 
REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
19 Church of Saint Giovannello GERACE 
20 “Centocamere” Archeological area LOCRI 
21 Greek Roman Theatre LOCRI 
22 National Archeological Museum LOCRI 
23 Archeological area MONASTERACE 
24 Leonida Repaci’ s Cultural house PALMI 
25 Aragon Castle REGGIO DI CALABRIA 
26 Cilea’s Municipal Theatre REGGIO DI CALABRIA 
27 National Archeological Museum REGGIO DI CALABRIA 
28 The Catholic STILO 
29 Ruffo’ Castle SCILLA 
30 State Museum MILETO 
VIBO 
VALENTIA 
31 National Archeological Museum “Vito 
Capialbi” VIBO VALENTIA 
32 Norman Swew Castle VIBO VALENTIA 
33 Murat’ s Museum PIZZO 
34 Murat Castle PIZZO 
35 Cistercensis Convent SERRA SAN BRUNO 
Source: Forte, Mantovani (2004). 
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Natural Resources 4,173 54.5 38.9 
Cultural Resources 794 31.5 26.6 
Human Resources 1,542 18.6 15.8 
Local Development Systems 4,092 27.7 22.4 
Towns 1,433 70.2 44.6 
Infrastructural Investments 8,377 85.7 64.0 
Technical Assistance 23 2.6 2.5 
Total 20,434 44.5 34.7 




Regression results: a comment 
 
According to the diagnostic checks, the goodness-of-fit is acceptable (the 
coefficient of determination and the adjusted coefficient both are 
>56%), while the F-stat reveals as the set of independent variables (joint-
ly considered) significantly differs from zero, since we strongly reject the 
null hypothesis. 
Ramsey’ RESET test controls whether non-linear combinations of 
the estimated values help explain the endogenous variable (Ramsey, 
1969). The intuition behind the test is that, if non-linear combinations of 
the explanatory variables have any power in explaining the endogenous 
variable, then the model is mis-specified. Since we don’t reject the null 
hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables, we might conclude 
that it is well-specified. 
The mean Variance Inflation Factor is equal to 2.52. VIF gives a 
quick check for multicollinearity. 1/VIF tells us what proportion of an 
explanatory variable’s variance is independent of all the other X va-
riables. A low proportion indicates potential trouble. VIF values provide 
guidance but not direct measurements of the increase in coefficient va-
riances. Nevertheless, Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) suggest a sort of “rule 
of thumb”: if the mean VIF is considerably larger than 1, we could sus-
pect for the presence of multicollinearity. With our mean VIF less than 
3, and our largest VIF close to 5.5, our regression clearly doesn’t meet 
both criteria. Moreover, the tolerance statistics is >0.2, so there is not a 
multicollinearity problem (Menard, 1995). 
Moreover, the pairwise correlation coefficients matrix patently shows 
us that – either we use Bonferroni-adjusted significance level or Sidak-
adjusted significance level – exists only a troublesome correlation be-
tween amounts and payments, but this collinearity doesn’t distort very 
deeply our estimate (Abdi, 2007). 
Yet, if our model really is specified correctly, then if we were to re-
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gress lnamounts_pc on the prediction and the prediction squared, the pre-
diction squared would have no explanatory power. This is what linktest 
does (Tukey, 1949; Pregibon, 1979).We find that the prediction squared 
does have explanatory power, so our specification is not as good as we 
thought. Although linktest is formally a test of the specification of the 
dependent variable, it is often interpreted as a test that, conditional on 
the specification, the independent variables are specified incorrectly. 
Finally, we analyze the normality of residuals. We conducted three 
different test to check the Gaussian distribution of residuals: Jarque and 
Bera test (1987), Shapiro and Wilk test (1965), Shapiro and Francia test 
(1972). Since all these tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of normality, 
we are able to conclude in favour of normality assumption. 
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